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Several of Michael Oakeshott’s writings, including On 
Human Conduct ([1975] 1991), employ an argumentative 
device that is shared with several other twentieth century 
thinkers, but which has not received much attention on its 
own terms. The device involves antinomies—the most fa-
mous of Oakeshott’s being the antinomy between the state 
understood as a civil association and as an enterprise asso-
ciation. The antinomies between the politics of faith and the 
politics of skepticism, individualist and collectivist think-
ing, rationalist and pragmatic politics, and, in the essay 
“The Rule of Law” (1983), between the pure neutral rule of 
law and policy, work in the same way. These uses compare 
to some other prominent cases: Max Weber’s antinomic 
distinction between the politics of conviction and the poli-
tics of responsibility; Carl Schmitt’s claims about the ulti-
mate incompatibility of liberalism and democracy; Hans J. 
Morgenthau’s antinomy of love and power; in Edward Shils, 
who explicitly addresses antinomies in “The Antinomies 
of Liberalism” ([1978] 1997) and in The Torment of 
Secrecy (1956), and more recently in Chantal Mouffe’s The 
Democratic Paradox (2000).1
These thinkers exemplify a core project of de-mythifica-
tion and de-ideologization which can be understood as a 
liberal counter project to ideological liberalism and to ide-
ology generally. A naïve reading of these thinkers treats 
them as relativists. But this is a misreading. The antinomic 
vision of politics is different from relativism in any simple 
sense of this term. It is specifically distinct from, and op-
posed to, the idea that there can be an ideological “solu-
tion” to the antinomies in question. This is not relativism: 
it is not relativistic about the ideologies in question. It de-
nies that they can be correct doctrines. For these thinkers, 
ideological thinking is an error: a false escape from the ir-
reducibly antinomic character of political life and political 
choice. From the point of view of antinomists, projects like 
“democratic theory” presume, in contrast, that the relevant 
antinomies can be reconciled in theory: that the antinomies 
are, in the end, false ones. 
In this paper I will examine the use and meaning of these 
antinomies, and disentangle their use from misinterpre-
tations, as well as show how their recognition represents a 
critique of and alternative to standard modes of political 
philosophy. In doing so I will cover some familiar ground. 
My aim, however, will be different: to explicate the form of 
reasoning itself. Oakeshott says a good deal about the an-
tinomic character of the specific antinomies he explores, 
and their conditions, though he uses a different terminol-
ogy. But he does not discuss antinomies as a class, or, so 
to speak, from the outside. He does not say, for example, 
that freedom and equality are not antinomic in the sense 
of the antinomies he does explore, though this, and the an-
tinomies of the term freedom, in the famous case of Isaiah 
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Berlin’s Two Concepts of Liberty (1958), formed a large part 
of the intellectual landscape in which he wrote. Nor does he 
distinguish the cases he focuses on from other binary op-
positions—life and death, good and evil, eros and thanatos, 
yin and yang, and so forth. In what follows I will attempt 
to distinguish the genuine antinomies from the mere op-
positions, and explain what makes these antinomies work, 
and what is implied by their existence. In doing so I will 
draw from Oakeshott, especially from works such as The 
Politics of Faith and Scepticism (1996), where he is especial-
ly open and plain-spoken about their sources and nature. 
Oakeshott was famously disinclined to talk about method. 
As Kenneth Minogue says, “Oakeshott’s inclination was to 
reject methodological formulae and to rely upon a philo-
sophical self-consciousness about the precise relevance of 
the questions being asked and answered” (Minogue 1993, p. 
viii). But he often did speak about the conditions for and the 
goals of understanding political ideas, if not in a way that 
readily answers the questions I have raised here, so there 
are resources in addition to the analyses themselves with 
which to answer them. 
PRINCIPLISM AND ITS METHOD 
We can begin by describing a methodological contrast, 
which may itself have the character of an antinomy, be-
tween antinomism understood as a method or meta-theo-
ry of the political, and what we might call principlism. This 
ugly term will be discarded, however, once the implications 
of the “antinomist” alternative become clear. The contrast 
can be seen in a simple recent case, Eric Beerbohm’s In Our 
Name: The Ethics of Democracy (2012). The core of his ar-
gument is that citizens are responsible for actions taken in 
their name. As the argument was recently summarized, 
Beerbohm 
takes on the important question of citizen responsi-
bility for policy decisions, and demonstrates that it 
should be the primary lens through which we should 
view the problem of self-government. He convinc-
ingly shows why many of our assumptions about rep-
resentative government and institutional design are 
mistaken. He argues that democracies should make 
transparent the responsibility that each citizen bears 
for policies as a result of participating in elections. 
Current institutions often mask that responsibility 
and require redesign.  They should be constructed to 
ensure transparency and so that citizen responsibility 
might be realized (Brettschneider 2015, np). 
This is a simple example of the procedure. It tries to iden-
tify the underlying and grounding principle of democracy, 
“the primary lens,” and derives a normative lesson from it, 
making this into a critical or standard-setting theory by 
which democracies can be judged, and also reformed, in ac-
cordance with the principle. 
In this case, and indeed in principlism generally, princi-
ples are held to be in some sense both derived from “current 
institutions” and superior to them. In this particular case, 
and indeed for “democratic theory” generally, antipathy to 
actual democratic institutions is at the heart of the argu-
ment. Here the argument is that the ordinary machinery of 
government, and indeed elections themselves, fail to make 
transparent the responsibilities each citizen bears, and need 
to be given an institutional redesign in accordance with the 
principle. It is only a slight irony that this kind of demo-
cratic theory is itself anti-democratic: the procedures and 
institutions which are being challenged by the theory were 
themselves arrived at through democratic procedures, and 
may rightly represent enduring preferences of the people 
who are governed by them. Democratic decisions about 
the nature of the democracy under which people live are 
not, however, sufficient for “democratic theory.” The theo-
ry tells us that the mode of democratic approval was itself 
not properly democratic, and therefore the actual untutored 
will of the people is to be ignored in favor of the design that 
follows the principle, which in turn is derived not from the 
will of the people but from some other source. 
Interestingly, there is an antinomy produced by the unre-
alism of this principle. The creation and execution of policy 
requires leaders—decision-making is normally concentrat-
ed. And it is difficult to see how a model with no leader-
ship and no special concentration of responsibility in lead-
ers would work, at least in many of the situations faced by 
democracies. This points to a question and provides a sug-
gested answer. What, if anything, then, is the antinomy of 
“citizen responsibility”? Presumably it would be something 
like leadership—or responsible leadership, the ideal pro-
moted by Morgenthau and before him by Weber. The point 
of responsible leadership is that the leader takes responsi-
bility—for persuading the citizens, if necessary by decep-
tion, to support him or her in acting in the national inter-
est. And with this simple example one can begin to see what 
the issue between the antinomist and the principlist is. In 
its pure form, “citizen responsibility” is not possible: deci-
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sions need to be made on behalf of others, by people who 
take responsibility for these decisions—this is the essence 
not only of leadership, but of government itself. One might 
want to minimize these kinds of decisions, and maximize 
“citizen responsibility for policy decisions” by such means 
as feeding information about the consequences of policies 
back to the citizens in a transparent fashion, but in prac-
tice some decision-making will always be made on behalf 
of citizens: it would be impractical for every citizen to know 
everything about policies. The ideal is an unrealizable ideal-
type. Dictatorship, in contrast, in which leaders take all the 
responsibility for decisions, is not an unrealizable type. But 
even dictators need legitimacy, and are in this sense at least 
accountable, and their followers “responsible.” 
The principlist deals with objections and obstacles, espe-
cially with incompatible ideals, in various ways. In the liter-
ature on Weber, which is also concerned with the problem 
of legitimacy and leadership and the antinomies it produc-
es, the standard “democratic theory” strategy is to impute 
to Weber a “democratic theory” which makes democratic 
legitimacy a ground and principle (Breiner 1996; Kalyvas 
2008) or alternatively to criticize him for having the wrong 
theory of this sort (Maley 2011). Much of the effort of recent 
democratic theory has been focused on the troublesome 
idea of freedom: democracy is supposed to be the font of all 
good things, but of course it is also a form of rule, and en-
gaged in coercion. So these raw facts need to be reconciled 
with the ideal of rule by the people. One way is to redefine 
freedom, as for example Phillip Pettit does (1997), in terms 
of non-domination, and then to define domination as that 
which the people regard as cases of domination. This sal-
vages an idea of democracy by making freedom depend on 
what the people say, but indirectly: we are no longer talk-
ing about freedom in even the ordinary sense of the term. 
Another method is to reconcile justice and freedom by put-
ting them in different categories: freedom can be seen as a 
good which must be distributed according to the principles 
of justice. Yet another way is to claim that there is a real, 
or at least possibly real, embodiment of the democratic idea 
in certain circumstances in which there is no state, and no 
machinery of democracy, in a revolutionary event in which 
all contradictions disappear: in which a kind of collective 
mental fusion occurs in which the people’s will is simulta-
neously formed and expressed, without the impediments 
of procedures and authority, and therefore both freely and 
democratically at once. 
The procedure of reconciling conflicts by subsuming 
them under a principle is particularly fertile in one respect: 
it provides the basis for academic writing which applies, re-
fines, or generates alternatives to the principles proposed 
by others. Much of this reasoning depends on definitions 
and the refinement of definitions, redefinitions which are 
supposed, as Pettit’s replacement of freedom in the sense 
of non-interference with “non-domination” does, to allow 
conflicts to be eliminated. It was an ironic consequence of 
neo-Kantianism that it aspired to identify the transcen-
dental conditions of knowledge, its necessary and therefore 
unique presuppositions, but produced, rather than a unique 
list, a proliferation of competing and conflicting systems, 
all of which claimed to have identified the “necessary” con-
ditions in question. Principlism in political philosophy has 
the same effect: after a long period in which Rawlsian prin-
ciples and philosophical methods and their application 
held sway, only to become passé, the same goal of finding 
a single unifying principle rooted in a special philosophi-
cal method has lived on. The only lesson learned from the 
Rawlsian project was that system building grounded in a 
single principle is a good thing. 
What we are dealing with in the case of antinomies are 
conflicts or incompatibilities in the domain of principles. 
The temptation to resolve the incompatibility at the level 
of principles is thus not surprising. From the point of view 
of logic, in any case, there is nothing inconsistent about 
choosing freedom over equality, or the reverse. So why is 
there an issue about making them compatible in the first 
place? From a principlist point of view, it might be seen to 
be better to have a theory that can not only explain more 
than its rivals but also explain its rivals. So there are clear 
motives for an argument that eliminates many apparently 
conflicting claims by redefining them and reducing them to 
a more fundamental principle. 
What is the antinomist’s motive? Without falling into 
principlism, she cannot simply be proving another prin-
ciple by the same means. Nor can the antinomist provide 
principled reasons for the claim that a resolution in prin-
ciple between the antinomic sides is impossible. But an-
tinomic arguments nevertheless are about the relation 
between principles. The relation, however, is not philosoph-
ical: the antinomist assumes that the principles or ideas in 
question are, on the one hand, “ideal,” and on the other that 
they cannot both be realized fully without conflict with the 
other: one cannot in the actual political world, for exam-
ple, maximize freedom without producing as a by product 
some inequality. Nor can one reduce inequality, at least in 
the radical manner envisioned by equality understood as an 
ideal, without depriving people of some of their freedom. 
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These are banalities. Some of the ideals may be impossible 
to realize, but can be realized partially. But the antinomist 
makes a more interesting point: that the achievement of the 
ideal requires, as a condition, in some sense, things associ-
ated with its apparent contrary. This is not a philosophical 
requirement, though in some cases it comes close to being 
one, but a practical requirement, that holds in the particu-
lar world governed by a large set of particular or local con-
tingencies, such as the world of modern European politics 
rather than in all possible worlds, as a genuine relation of 
entailment would. It involves factual conditions rather than 
logical ones. It is therefore a method, so to say, of political 
theory rooted in real political possibilities, rather than po-
litical philosophy rooted in ethical or other principles. But 
the factual conditions in question become apparent and rel-
evant only through the lens of the conflict of ideals. 
The obvious alternative conclusion—that there is a plural-
ity of irreducibly competing and conflicting principles each 
of which has some attraction—cannot be addressed with 
the methods of redefinition and assimilating to a founda-
tional principle. But there is a problem with this conclusion 
that the principlist will instantly recognize. Even acknowl-
edging the fact of irreducible conflict turns into a discussion 
of the grounding principle of this acknowledgement. The 
principlist will immediately assimiliate this acknowledge-
ment to relativism, and conclude that relativism is self-re-
futing and consequently this conclusion cannot be genuine-
ly rational. And one can see that the antinomist can easily 
fall into this trap by providing non-relativist “grounds” for 
their position, for example as Chantal Mouffe does, by in 
effect proposing a new doctrine of agonistic liberalism, in 
which the recognition of irreconcilable conflicts is given an 
implicit teleological justification, to stand alongside the te-
leological ends of principled, reductionist political philoso-
phies. This creates its own antinomy—with the kind of pol-
itics represented by Jürgen Habermas, in which there is a 
teleological pull toward the elimination of disagreement. 
But Mouffe falls into the temptation of justifying agnostic 
liberalism as “progressive”: Oakeshott famously denies that 
politics has a teleology, other than his comment on seeking 
coherence, to which we will return.
But what if principlism as a style of philosophizing is, as 
neo-Kantianism was, defective and inherently unable to 
achieve its goal of identifying the underlying true norma-
tive principles of politics? A plausible reason for thinking 
this to be the case would be that there are antinomies—
that there are conflicting and incompatible ideas which 
have some sort of attraction or intellectual compulsion, but 
which cannot be reduced to a framework based on either of 
the ideas. This is the core thought of the antinomists. But it 
depends on a number of other ways of thinking about these 
issues which have never been fully articulated, and which 
may seem obvious, but which are perhaps worth making 
explicit, if only to clarify how antinomism both differs from 
principlism, and what principlism looks like if we accept 
the existence of irreducible antinomies. 
WHAT ARE ANTINOMIES?
One point about such principles should be already appar-
ent: for each principle there is not only an alternative, but 
something more: a kind of counter-principle which trades 
on the absences, qualifications, or deficiencies of the prin-
ciple in question. Put a little differently, one situation of 
argumentation involving “alternatives” would be this: we 
agree on certain premises, perhaps many, and disagree on 
a few—opening up the possibility that these disagreements, 
once isolated, may be open to being resolved. Antinomism 
makes a different point: that there are attractions, indepen-
dent of one another, of each pole of the antinomy. They are 
in tension. The tension is a result not of some sort of con-
ceptual error, but of the real presence of attraction, either 
the attraction of an ideal or the attraction of practical ne-
cessities which cannot in the end be denied. Nevertheless, 
the two poles are bound to one another. 
This binding is difficult to explain, in part because, as we 
will see, it is not a binding at the level of principle, but of 
contingent fact. But there are also other relations, which 
are important for historical interpretation, and therefore 
of understanding the principles and disentangling them 
from their counterfeits. One of these involves the ambigu-
ity of political terms and their malleability, which gives an 
illusion of commonality and continuity as well as feeds the 
hope that a further principle can resolve the ambiguities. 
Oakeshott makes the point that the term salus populi has 
been appropriated for a vast range of political purposes and 
thus been given a variety of meanings. “Democracy” is not 
merely ambiguous but deeply ambiguous—the home of its 
own antinomic interpretations. Similarly for “a right”: 
The word “right” when preceded by the indefinite arti-
cle enjoys a scale of meanings which ranges from one 
extreme to another, the extremes of meaning being, I 
contend, the meanings respectively appropriate to our 
two styles of politics (Oakeshott 1996, p. 42).
CO
SM
O
S + TA
X
IS
58
VOLUME 6  |  ISSUE 1 + 2 2018
These terms have a traceable genealogy, which can re-
veal how the antinomic interpretations arise and how they 
change. 
But Oakeshott makes the further point that resolving 
these conflicts and ambiguities is not in principle impos-
sible, because the conflicts are contingent in the first place. 
Confucius, when he was asked what he would do first 
were he appointed governor, replied: “the one thing 
necessary is the rectification of names.” He meant 
that “things” could never be “straightened out” while 
words remained equivocal. The observation was, of 
course, immediately appropriate to the politics of his 
situation, where government was not distracted be-
tween two opposed directions of activity (Oakeshott 
1996, p. 132).
This was not an isolated comment. Oakeshott makes the 
more general point that certain kinds of societies may not 
experience these antinomies.
In a community whose members, engaged in few ac-
tivities and those of the simplest character, are not 
drawn in a variety of directions, the politics of faith 
will have some appropriateness. Indeed, a monolithic 
society may be expected to have a monolithic politics 
(Oakeshott 1996, p. 95).
These remarks raise a number of important questions. 
The contingency of these antinomic conflicts distinguish-
es them from disagreements, dichotomies, taxonomies, 
and mere alternatives. But what are the contingencies? Are 
they escapable, or deep? And the contingent character of 
the conflicts raises the question of whether the political ap-
proach to them should be to alter the contingencies them-
selves through revolutionary means. 
Understanding the contingent character of the an-
tinomies, in general and specifically those discussed by 
Oakeshott, may be helped by comparison to Weber’s dis-
tinction between the ethics of intention or conviction and 
the ethics of responsibility. Weber’s point about these “eth-
ics,” which of course are abstractions from commonplace 
ethical thinking conditioned by Christianity, is not that 
they are always and everywhere in conflict. In general good 
things follow from well-intended actions: we would find it 
difficult to understand them as well-intended if the intender 
foresaw harms from them. But there are situations in which 
this is not the case, and for Weber, as for Oakeshott, it is in 
politics—or as Oakeshott puts it, in the activity of gover-
nance—that the antinomies reveal themselves. 
The way the conflicts appear in politics, in the activ-
ity of governance, however, differs from the general case. 
In one sense, there is a categorical distinction between an 
ethic of consequences and one of intentions. Intentions in 
the Christian tradition from which Weber came were vis-
ible only to God, and sin was intending in a way contrary 
to His will. Fiat justitia et pereat mundus2 is a slogan that 
makes sense in this tradition, because the “world” which 
is allowed to perish is inferior to the other-world promised 
by God. But the relation between this-worldly and other-
worldly is not an antinomic choice: it is merely a choice—
the choice Weber underlines by quoting Machiavelli on the 
Florentines who put their city above their soul in the war 
with the Pope ([1919] 1946, p. 126). In the realm of the po-
litical itself, however, matters are different. Politics is a this-
worldly affair. There, the extremes of the ethics of intention 
are barely intelligible. Weber’s example is the bomb-throw-
ing anarchist who has no hope for, or care about, the real-
ization of the this-worldly political goal of anarchism. This 
person can only be understood in other-worldly, which is to 
say non-political, terms. Similarly for the extremes of the 
ethic of consequences: without intending to realize some 
ideal good, but seeking only power, the career of the power-
politician “leads nowhere and is senseless.”
Within politics it is a contingent fact that the two eth-
ics conflict, and they conflict only over specific instances 
of political decision: a politician may never be faced with 
this conflict. To be sure, there is such a thing as an other-
worldly politics: this is the politics of the Grand Inquisitor, 
as described by Carl Schmitt, who places the salvation of 
his subjects’ souls above any earthly goal (Taubes [1987] 
2013, p. 7). But there is nothing antinomic about this choice: 
the Grand Inquisitor is not an impossible figure, limited by 
a nemesis that arises from his own actions; neither is the 
politician with this-worldly goals. Nor is there any de facto 
requirement that each partake in the character of the oth-
er. In the case of Weber’s distinction, it is different: when 
Weber quotes Luther in his comment that “here I stand I 
can do no other” ([1919] 1946, p. 127) he is pointing to the 
limits of the politics of responsibility, its nemesis, the need 
for an element of conviction that saves it from the sense-
lessness of the power politician. And when he discusses the 
Christian in politics motivated by the law of love and the 
belief that only good comes out of good acts, he is pointing 
to the nemesis of either failure or morally compromising 
action, the moral compromise resulting from the fact that 
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politics is an activity in which the morally dangerous and 
unpredictable means of violence is characteristic, because it 
is characteristic of states. 
So we have here a complex set of distinctions, including 
both antinomies and non-antinomic classifications. This-
worldly and other-worldly, theory and practice, political 
ideals and the governance—these are all categorical distinc-
tions, rather than antinomies. Their use enables us to isolate 
and identify genuine antinomies. But antinomies are not, so 
to speak, in the Platonic eternal. They are contingent, and 
contingent in more than one way. One way is revealed by 
the phenomenon of nemesis, to which we will now turn. 
Another is the way pointed to by Oakeshott’s references to 
Confucius and to primitive societies. Antinomies are antin-
omies for us—people with a particular background and his-
tory which is present in the attractions we have for particu-
lar ideals, which is itself a contingent fact. This contingency, 
which we may call a deep contingency, because it is not re-
solvable or alterable by short term or political means, needs 
some explanation, for understanding this kind of contin-
gency is central to understanding what binds the antinomic 
pairs together.
BINDING AND NEMESIS
As we have noted, Oakeshott makes an the observation that 
many of the key terms of political discourse are ambigu-
ous, and have developed conflicting meanings, or changed 
meanings, over time. The fact that the terms are the same 
binds these usages without our having to discover that they 
are bound. “Ambiguity,” however, while it is a useful term 
for understanding the history of a concept, is not precise 
enough. There is the ambiguity of the term bachelor, ap-
plied to unmarried men and also to graduates. There is no 
antinomic conflict here—merely multiple meanings. In the 
case of “democracy,” however, the different meanings not 
only conflict, but stand in a relation to one another that is 
not extricable by redefinition: the two meanings, are bound 
to one another in a distinctive non-accidental way. So what 
we need is an answer to the question “How are antinomic 
pairs bound to one another?” whether or not they are mul-
tiple meanings of the same term. 
What makes them antinomic rather than merely typo-
logical? One answer is this: the practical exceptions one 
must make to the principle refer to the antinomic partner. 
Schmitt turns this into a methodological principle: that, 
as he quotes Kierkegaard, “the exception explains the gen-
eral and itself. And if one wants to study the general cor-
rectly, one only needs to look around for a true exception” 
(2005, p. 15). This part of the idea is simple: the nature of 
the general claim is revealed by the exception. A simple ex-
ample of this might be taken from Karl Polanyi’s The Great 
Transformation ([1944] 2001). The general principle he in-
vokes is that capitalism dehumanized people by substitut-
ing the cash nexus for genuine social relations, and that 
only socialism can restore them. The “exception” he ac-
knowledges is this: some people will not accede to these 
genuine relations voluntarily, and must be taken care of 
separately, as misfits. As Polanyi says, the “objector” should 
be offered a niche into which he can retire, the choice of a 
“second-best,” that leaves him a life to live. Thus will be se-
cured the right to non-conformity that is the hallmark of 
a free society. The general principle is revealed by this ex-
ception to the principle of socialist solidarity,3 which is be-
lied by the existence of “objectors” (Polanyi [1944] 2001, p. 
255). Both the character of the antinomic principle and its 
antinomic pair are revealed by this strategy. The demand of 
conformism is concealed in the idea of solidarity; the need 
to punish or corral the non-conforming is revealed by the 
exigencies of the application of the idea. 
Leo Strauss, commenting on Weber, dismissed his ex-
amples with the comment that the political conflicts could 
easily be resolved by considerations of prudence and the 
like. His thought was that issues of conflict in general could 
be resolved by a suitable Aristotelian hierarchy of ends in 
which these considerations could be balanced ([1953] 1965, 
pp. 68-9). But Strauss’s appeal to prudential considerations 
has the effect of conceding Oakeshott’s point: there are con-
tingent situations in which an appeal to prudential consid-
erations is necessary to resolve a conflict between princi-
ples. The question is whether these situations are central to 
actual political life, to the activity of governance, or are ex-
ceptions which can be ignored in favor of an otherwise ap-
plicable hierarchy of the good.4 
For Oakeshott, in practice conflicting ideals can be and 
are reconciled, though not definitively: this indeed is the es-
sence of politics. But how do these antinomies work? Why 
are they not just alternative value choices? This requires 
some analysis. They are ideal-types, neither of which is ful-
ly realizable because it is dependent in some manner on its 
antinomic pair.5 The pairs are thus linked, but in conflict. 
One can suppress one side of the pair, but not obliterate it. 
Even the state oriented fully to substantive rather than pro-
cedural justice, for example, cannot operate without pro-
cedures—Cadi justice requires the appointment of a Cadi, 
for example; the state which aspires to neutrality, similar-
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ly, must be legitimate, and seen to be effective in achieving 
some substantive goods for its participants. These are not 
hard analytic truths, but lessons that result from putting 
ideals into practice, as Oakeshott himself says. 
Strauss, however, has a point: the argument depends on 
the identification of conflicts at the level of political ideals 
that may not be apparent in the ordinary course of politics. 
The use of extreme “conceivable but not realistic” examples 
to bring out these conflicts is worth examining. It appears 
repeatedly in Oakeshott’s own writings. Take a simple ex-
ample from Oakeshott:
What we are seeking is an alleged mode of association 
in which the associates are expressly and exclusively 
related in terms of the recognition of rules of conduct 
of a certain kind, namely “laws.” And what we have 
here is associates related expressly and exclusively in 
terms of seeking to satisfy substantive wants (1983, p. 
124). 
The “expressly and exclusively” phrase signals the unreal-
ity of these extreme cases. In practice, as Oakeshott himself 
says, the extreme case of a rule of law regime is not realiz-
able. The alternative extreme is perhaps possible, though as 
we will see, the possibility depends on contingencies. 
So what is their function in the argument? As Walter 
Benjamin puts it: 
The general is the idea. The empirical, on the oth-
er hand, can be all the more profoundly understood 
the more clearly it is seen as an extreme. The concept 
has its roots in the extreme. Just as a mother is seen to 
begin to live in the fullness of her power only when 
the circle of her children, inspired by the feeling of 
her proximity, closes around her, so do ideas come to 
life only when extremes are assembled around them 
(Benjamin [1928] 2003, p. 35).
Bloodless abstraction, the grey of theory, is a realm in 
which antinomies can be reconciled. Much of the time, as 
noted, they can be reconciled in practice. It is in the ex-
tremes of the empirical that they become recognizable.
Maxims of the sort quoted by Benjamin sound system-
atic, but they are not. This one is already in the form of a 
paradox, since the general has, by definition, no exceptions. 
To understand it we need to see how it works in these argu-
ments. Oakeshott, in Politics of Faith, uses the term “nem-
esis,” which is closer to the point: which is that in practice 
a given tendency to realize an idea is undone or limited in 
distinctive ways; distinctive in that they arise from consid-
erations associated with its antinomic pair. In discussing 
the nemesis of the politics of faith, or perfection, he lists a 
number of examples: 
the engagement to impose a single pattern of activi-
ty upon a community is a self-defeating engagement 
(Oakeshott 1996, p. 99). 
The politics of skepticism, and its antinomic pair of the 
politics of faith or perfectibility, each have their own nem-
esis that points to the other in the pair: 
The disposition of scepticism to underestimate the oc-
casion is another facet of this defeat. Faith recognizes 
every occasion as an emergency, and in the name of 
the “public interest” or the “public advantage” main-
tains its antinomian rule by calling upon the vast 
power at its command, which (because it is always 
insufficient) is always in process of being enlarged 
(Oakeshott 1996, p. 108). 
The nemesis of the politics of perfectibility is that po-
litical power is always insufficient to achieve it—precisely 
the confession that Polanyi makes, justifying the “neces-
sary” practices which he was well aware were characteristic 
of Stalinism, when he admits that solidarism will never be 
complete.
But skepticism has its own nemesis. 
It is liable to confuse a genuine emergency with the 
counterfeit emergencies of faith, and to discount it. 
But in doing so it displays an insufficiency which puts 
it on the road to the other manner of self-defeat to 
which it is liable (Oakeshott 1996, p. 109).
This failure and the inadequacies it reveals is part of the 
“real” to which Oakeshott and antinomists more generally 
attend. But we can ask about other parts of the real as well: 
the nature of deep contingency, and the relation between 
ideals and the stuff from which they are, as Oakeshott puts 
it, “extricated.”
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DEEP CONTINGENCY, IDEAL-TYPES, AND THE 
DATA OF HISTORY
Ideals need to be formulated for their antinomic character 
to be revealed. They are not necessarily apparent in the flux 
of ordinary political talk. The abstraction in question, be-
cause it is an imaginative enterprise, is not mechanical or 
scientific. The material with which it works is our way of 
talking about political things, and the way that they were 
talked of in the past. They 
reveal themselves in our manner of speaking, and 
they are cogent formulations only in so far as they 
make intelligible the current and historic distraction 
of our politics (Oakeshott 1996, p. 44).
Our talk about politics is not merely a mass of unconnect-
ed habits of speaking and acting, but a complex web under-
lain with purposes and with connected and conflicting pur-
poses. We can find different coherences or ideal-characters 
at the surface of this web. 
As Oakeshott says, “The uninhibited character of each 
of these two styles of politics has, then, to be extricated.” 
Formulating them provides a kind of coherence to ordinary 
talk, but “to elicit this is an imaginative rather than a logical 
exercise; not a purely logical exercise” (1996, p. 92). But the 
formulation is not merely a matter of providing a definition 
identifying a family of notions that correspond roughly to 
what is in effect a kind of ideal-type, and indicating what 
the pull or attraction of these ideals (or rather the under-
lying purposes and aspirations which they articulate) is. It 
also requires revealing their character by identifying their 
nemesis or the exceptions that appear as they are put into 
practice. As Oakeshott explains, 
Whenever the politics of modern Europe have moved 
decisively in the direction of either of these extremes, 
the shadow of the nemesis has appeared: our task is to 
reconstruct from these shadowy intimations the hid-
den character, or at least the hidden characteristics 
which they signify (ibid.). 
So finding the coherence of an ideal, or constructing it 
imaginatively out of the raw material of political speech, is 
more than a matter of logic in a variety of ways. It relates to 
the pushback of the real world in the form of nemesis, ex-
ception, and unintended consequences. But it also, because 
the antinomic relations depend on contingencies, relates to 
the contingencies of the real world as well.
This relationship is difficult to explain, for epistemic rea-
sons that will become obvious. The principlist regards such 
contingencies as mere conditions to be altered in pursuit of 
the ideal and the elimination of the antinomy: as bumps in 
the road, or eggs needing to be scrambled to make a revo-
lutionary omelet. But the failure to realize the ideals points 
to the difficulty of knowing what the relevant contingen-
cies are. The topic is a theme of Oakeshott in the “On Being 
Conservative” (1962) where a contrast is identified between 
those who think that large scale change can be planned 
with predictable outcomes and those who believe the world 
is complex in ways that belie our ability to predict the con-
sequences of our actions, especially those involving large 
scale change. 
Some of the contingent facts that bear on antinomies, 
and which form their conditions, are what we might call 
“shallow”: altering them is possible, and there are predict-
able risks, costs, and benefits from doing so. Deep contin-
gencies, however, are those which we cannot readily alter, 
or predict the outcome of altering, and typically are unable 
to conceptualize clearly in the first place. They exist in the 
longue durée. It is this kind of contingency that Oakeshott 
has in mind when he says that 
Political activity in the conditions of modern Europe 
is movement within a certain field of historic possibil-
ities. During this half-millennium these possibilities 
have expanded in some directions and contracted in 
others: what may be contemplated now is in some re-
spects a smaller and in others a larger range of activ-
ity than it was five hundred years ago. But these con-
tractions and expansions are relatively insignificant. 
The range of internal movement is fundamentally un-
changed (Oakeshott 1996, p. 117).
This is not to say that rapid change is not possible: he also 
adds that “modern history may be said to have been inau-
gurated by a peculiarly large and rapid expansion of politi-
cal possibilities, and its course, from this point of view, has 
been the more and more thorough exploitation of a range of 
movement then opened up” (ibid.). This was not the aim of 
the people who produced this change: their aims were not 
even political. Oakeshott locates a major component of the 
changes that allowed for the expansion of state power as the 
rise of individualism which eventuates in the Reformation 
(Oakeshott 1993, p. 22). 
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This is very murky territory. The deep contingencies that 
may become salient in the future, as conditions for previ-
ously unrealized or unconceived antinomies, may already 
be present in the deep history of a culture, or even more 
deeply rooted. Morgenthau, under the influence late in life 
of psychoanalysis, argued that the antinomy of love and 
power was fundamental. But because the salience of antino-
mies comes and goes, we need to avoid the temptation to 
ascribe these antinomies to human nature, without denying 
the possibility that they are indeed that deeply rooted. 
ANTINOMISM VS. PRINCIPLISM:  
IS THIS A METHODOLOGICAL ANTINOMY?
In passing, I earlier commented that the relation between 
principlism and antinomism might itself be an antinomy. 
There is something to be said for this: the two approach-
es are in some important respects kindred. Both are ab-
stractions from political experience and ordinary political 
speech; both aim at clarifying it or giving it greater coher-
ence. Principle-seeking is, in any case, part of the political 
life the antinomist is concerned to study. 
To abridge conduct into general principles is … a su-
premely important level of political thinking. And 
even at first sight it is obvious that some of these gen-
eralizations refer to the constitutions of government 
and others to the office or conduct of government 
(Oakeshott 1993, p. 14). 
But the motives we might have for this kind of reconstruc-
tion will vary. One is “to understand what forms of behav-
ior they represent or are intended to represent, and to rec-
ognize the part that they play” (ibid.). Oakeshott himself 
acknowledges that this is a hazardous affair. But more haz-
ardous is the attempt to ground these principles in some-
thing more fundamental—to make them more than ar-
ticulations of our practices, and into fundamental truths, 
beyond the contingencies that gives rise to antinomies. 
An asymmetry between principlism and antinomism 
prevents them from being true antinomies. What the exis-
tence of contingent antinomies shows is that there are cir-
cumstances, contingencies, under which principles can-
not resolve antinomies. Antinomism acknowledges that 
there are situations in which principlism, in the form of the 
Confucian rectification of names, which might be the same 
as the articulation of a new concept of citizenship to match 
what has become the practice of citizenship, as Marshall 
did, might be appropriate and successful. But principlism 
cannot acknowledge that its own truths are contingent, or 
that its exceptions undermine its principles: they must be 
placed in a category below truth itself. 
NOTES
 1. The pairing of Weber and Oakeshott might at first 
glance seem odd, but there is an important and some-
what startling textual basis for this connection. 
Oakeshott reviewed Morgenthau’s Scientific Man 
versus Power Politics (1946) shortly before writing 
“Rationalism in Politics” ([1947-48]/1962). The review, 
which comments that “This is a book good enough to 
wish it were better, and profound enough to wish it 
were more lucid” ([1947]/1993, p. 97), reads like of a 
draft of Oakeshott’s classic paper, which provides ex-
actly this lucidity. Morgenthau’s text does not mention 
Weber, but is the most overtly Weberian of his writings 
(see Turner and Factor 1984). It was based on lectures 
at the New School which were part of a special émigré 
genre, in which Americanizing German scholars pre-
sented their views by eliminating German sources and 
substituting Anglo-American ones. This had a distort-
ing effect, but was also the source of novel connections, 
for example Morgenthau’s appropriation of Lincoln as 
the exemplary great leader. 
 2. Let justice be done though the world perish.
 3. Oakeshott discusses this impulse to enforced conform-
ism at length under the heading of solidarism (1993, 
pp. 89-99).
4. Strauss exempts the conflict between ethics of inten-
tion and ethics of consequences from his reduction 
to the prudential, but on ground familiar for Schmitt: 
Strauss interprets the conflict in its theological sense, 
as one between other-worldly and this worldly, or be-
tween the human and the divine, or theology and phi-
losophy. These are non-antinomic, categorical distinc-
tions.
 5. The term “pairs” is important, but should not be mis-
interpreted. Nothing excludes an antinomic trilemma, 
or indeed any number of antinomic elements. To be 
antinomic, however, the elements must be antinom-
ic to each of the other elements, that is to say form a 
pairwise antinomic relation with each of the other ele-
ments. 
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